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REINVENTING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WHILE
"DE-INVENTING" ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: IS IT
TIME FOR AN "APA" FOR REGULATING
OUTSOURCED GOVERNMENT WORK?
David H. Rosenbloom• and Suzanne J. Piotrowski..
INTRODUCTION

On June 23, 2005 the Washington Post reported that the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) planned to use a database on 16-18 year
old high school and college students as an aid in military recruitment.
The database contains birth dates, Social Security numbers, ethnicity,
grade-point averages, and the students' curricula and e-mail addresses. 1
Using state-of-the art "reinvented" public administration, which
emphasizes steering rather rowing, 2 the DOD outsourced creation of the
database to a private firm, BeNow, Inc. After all, the DOD's mission
and expertise do not lie in constructing such databases. Presumably
firms that specialize in database development can do so more costeffectively than government agencies whose work focuses on other
matters. However, privacy advocates suggested that the DOD's primary
motive in contracting out was not to save the taxpayers money but
rather "to circumvent laws that restrict the government's right to collect
or hold citizen information by turning to private firms to do the work."3
Technically, these advocates are probably wrong. The Privacy Act of
1974,4 which directly regulates the DOD, should be applicable
indirectly to its contractors through the Federal Acquisition Regulation.5
Nevertheless, these critics of the DOD's outsourcing are on to
something fundamental: when government . work is outsourced, the
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1. Jonathan Krim, Pentagon Creating Student Database: Recruiting Tool For Military
Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, at AOl.
2. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992); Al Gore,
Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less 7 (U.S Government Printing
Office, 1993).
3. Krim, supra note 1, at AO 1.
4. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7, 88 Stat. 1896, 2177, 2194.
5. Federal Acquisition Regulation, http://www.amet.gov/far (section 24.102(c)); see
infra note 72.
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administrative law values and constraints that apply to government are
apt to be lost.
As developed since the mid-1940s, administrative law includes
regulations for transparency, checks on administrative abuse and
intrusiveness, fair adjudication, stakeholder representation, and public
participation in administrative decision-making. 6 Broadly construed,
administrative law also extends to the constitutional law that regulates
agencies' interaction with clients, customers, their own employees,
persons confined to prisons and public mental health facilities,
contractors, and individuals encountered in street-level administration. 7
High profile examples of circumvention or obviation of federal
administrative law through outsourcing include United Space Alliance's
launch work on the space shuttle Columbia, which substantially reduced
the media's ability to use the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 8 to
gain information on the decision-making and risk analyses associated
with the tragic loss of the crew and shuttle. 9 Contracted for the DOD by
the Department of the Interior's National Business Center to interrogate
Iraqi prisoners, CACI, a private company, was deeply involved in the
shocking abuse of human rights at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq .10 The
ensuing damage to the U.S.'s self-image, national reputation, and
international standing cannot be mitigated by the fact that CACI is nongovernmental and neither U.S. administrative law nor, apparently,
constitutional law applied to its actions.
In the process of reinventing its public administration the U.S. is
"de-inventing" administrative law. More importantly, perhaps, it is
doing so by default, that is, without serious and substantial public
discussion and political debate on whether cost-effectiveness and other
values associated with reinvented public administration should trump
the norms embodied in administrative law. The readiness to accept the
reinventers' vision of "a government that works better and costs less" is
all the more striking in view of the nation's epic post-World War II
6. P. STRAUSS, T. RAKOFF, R. SCHOTLAN, & C. FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (9th ed. 1995); DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FOR
PUBLIC MANAGERS (2003).
7. DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM & R. O ' LEARY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW (1997);
David H. Rosenbloom, Retrofitting the Administrative State to the Constitution: Congress
and the Judiciary's Twentieth-Century Progress, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 39, 39-46 (2000).
8. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
9. A full record of pertinent information was obtained only through extraordinary
means.
See
Columbia
Accident
Investigation
Board-Final
Report,
http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/volumel/default.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
10. David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Outsourcing the Constitution and
Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 103, 109 (2005).
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struggle to "tame" the federal bureaucracy. 11
I.

DEMOCRATIZING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

Whether bureaucracy and democracy can ever be fully compatible
is a moot question. 12 Yet is it incontestable that, whatever their
imperfections, federal administrative law, including constitutional
doctrine, has gone a long way toward forcing democratic and
constitutional values into public administrative practice. The 1946
federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 13 was intended to be "a bill
of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are
controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal
Government." 14 As amended, it has fulfilled much of that promise,
though undoubtedly at the cost of encumbering administrative
flexibility and efficiency. 15 Much constitutional law since the 1950s has
had a similar impact by putting public bureaucracy in the "harness of
procedural due process" 16 and other constitutional rights.1 7 These
developments have been discussed at length elsewhere and need not be
reviewed here. 18 The point bearing emphasis is that the developments
encountered substantial resistance, continue to do so, and are being
eroded by the scale of contemporary outsourcing of government work to
private entities.
It took six years to enact the APA after its forerunner the WalterLogan Act of 1940 was successfully vetoed by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Even in 1946, there was some opposition from the agencies
including the view that congressional regulation of administrative

11. W. GORMLEY, JR., TAMING THE BUREAUCRACY (1989).
12. See generally CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY (1950);
DAVID NACHMIAS & DAVID H.. ROSENBLOOM, BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNMENT USA (1980);
RALPH P. HUMMEL, THE BUREAUCRATIC EXPERIENCE (4th ed. 1994); B. DAN WOOD &
RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS (1994); WILLIAM GORMLEY, JR., & S.
BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY (2004).
13. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 1946 (1946).
14. 79 CONG. REC. 92, 2150 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
15. This trade-off was deliberate. The Senate Judiciary Committee took " ... the
position that the [APA] bill must reasonably protect private parties even at the risk of some
incidental or possible inconvenience to, or change in, present administrative operations." 79
CONG. REC. 92, 2150 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
16. Spady v. Mount Vernon Hous. Auth., 419 U.S. 983, 985 (1974) (Dougals, J.,
dissenting).
17. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 7, at 102.
18. DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION: CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1946-1999 (2000);
ROSENBLOOM & O'LEARY, supra note 7, at 102.
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procedures was a "retrograde step." 19 Efforts to strengthen the APA's
ineffective provisions for transparency, beginning in the mid-1950s, met
with no success until the enactment of FOIA in 1966. President Lyndon
Baines Johnson signed the act only after complaining that the "goddam
bill will screw the Johnson administration!"20 Apparently every agency
that testified on the bill was opposed to it. 21 President Gerald Ford
unsuccessfully vetoed the 1974 FO IA amendments that substantially
facilitated access to government records. 22 In 2001, President George
W. Bush issued an executive order2 3 that could drastically reduce access
to information under the Presidential Records Act of 1978. 24 The
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (1972) 25 was an anathema to
President Richard M. Nixon and his appointees. As the bill made its
way through Congress, Nixon unsuccessfully tried to stifle its
enactment by issuing an executive order regulating advisory
committees. 26 The 1978 Government in the Sunshine Act has long been
criticized for encumbering and weakening administrative decisionmaking. 27 Defining an appropriate role for the President and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) in AP A prescribed rulemaking has
been a source of political contention since the 1970s. 28
Likewise, the judicial effort to force constitutional rights and
values into public administrative decision-making and other activity has
been widely criticized for both its intended and unintended
consequences. Opposition has been over both doctrine and
implementation. For example, if any single case were emblematic of the
"rights revolution" in public administration, it might be Goldberg v.

19. Testimony of Clyde Aitchison, Comm'r of the Interstate Commerce Comm'n
before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1944-1946, at 97 ( 1946).
20. KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
180 (1982).
21. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 18, at 50.
22. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (amending 4
U.S.C. § 552 (1967)) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
23. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R 815 (2001), reprinted in 44 U.S.C.A. § 2204
(2001).
24. Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. § 2201-2207 (1978).
25. Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
26. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT 19
(Pub. L. No. 92-463) (1978).
27. Randolph May, Recent Development: Reforming the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 415 (1997).
28. CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING 121-26 (2nd ed. 1999); DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS 75-79 (2003 ).
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Kelly (1970). 29 There, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court held that
constitutional procedural due process entitles welfare recipients to a
hearing prior to the termination of their benefits. 30 Long forgotten,
perhaps, is Justice Hugo Black's incredulousness at the Court's embrace
of "new property" theory: 31
The Court. . . relies upon the Fourteenth Amendment and in effect
says that the failure of the government to pay a promised charitable
installment to an individual deprives that individual of his own
property, in violation of the Due Process Clause. . . . It somewhat
strains credulity to say that the government's promise of charity to an
individual is property belonging to that individual when the
government denies that the individual is honestly entitled to receive
such a payment. 32

The constitutionalization of public administration · has been especially
criticized in the areas of public school desegregation, 33 prison
administration, 34 and public mental health care. 35
II.

REINVENTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The connection between reinventing government and de-inventing
administrative law is not happenstance. The National Performance
Review (NPR) considered administrative law and other procedural
requirements to be impediments to effective administration, that is, to
achieving "results": "Our path is clear: We must shift from systems that
hold people accountable for process to systems that hold them
accountable for results."36 Accordingly, the NPR called for dramatic
internal deregulation of federal administration: "The President should
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

Id. at 261.
See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
Golberg, 397 U.S. at 275 (emphasis in the original).

GERELD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE 38-172 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991); DONALD L. HORROWITZ, THE COURTS AND
SOCIAL POLICY 106-70 ( 1977).

34. COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS (John J. Diiulio, Jr. ed., 1990).
35. JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF
MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992); Note, The Wyatt Case:
Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338
(1975); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS (1994).
36. AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS
BETTER & COSTS LESS 13 ( 1993 ).
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issue a directive requiring all federal agencies to review internal
government regulations over the next three years, with a goal of
eliminating fifty percent of those regulations."37 To say the NPR
disliked rules would be an understatement. It subscribed to the belief
that, "The perverse effect of 'rule by rules' is that instead of reducing
arbitrariness it appears to increase it; instead of fostering cooperation it
destroys it; instead of solving problems it worsens them. " 38 By 1999,
the NPR claimed to have eliminated 16,000 pages from the Code of
Federal Regulations and 640,000 pages of internal agency regulations. 39
The NPR called for legal reforms of the federal personnel systems,
much reduced mandated reporting to Congress, reorientation of the
inspectors general, as well as better rulemaking processes and decisions.
However, it never tackled the APA or administrative law directly. 40
Neither did it necessarily respect the letter of the law when the APA
might pose obstacles to reform. Perhaps the most outstanding (and
embarrassing) example was the NPR's promotion of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's Cooperative Compliance Program.
The program offered firms relief from "wall-to-wall" inspections if they
complied with a checklist of voluntary standards established by OSHA.
The NPR gave the program's pilot version a much coveted Hammer
Award and touted it as a model of commonsensical reform. 41 The pilot
seemed to work well in Maine, but when OSHA implemented it
nationally firms complained that it was "more like coercion than
cooperation" and amounted to "ambush rulemaking. "42 The Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that the "voluntary" checklist
amounted to an illegal circumvention of the APA's requirements for
rulemaking. 43
As noted earlier, administrative law can also be legally
circumvented by outsourcing government work. However, eluding

37. Id. at 33.
38. AL GORE, COMMON SENSE GOVERNMENT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS 19
(1995).
39. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS ENDOWMENT FOR THE Bus. OF THE Gov'T, THE
BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT 7 (Ian Littman ed., 1999), available at http://www.businessof
government.org?pdfs?BusottiovtFall99 .pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
40. See generally GORE, supra note 38, at 20-34; Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638
(1993).
41. GORE, supra note 2, at 25-27.
42. Christy Harris, Lack of Procedure Kills OSHA Reinvention Program, FEDERAL
TIMES, April 26, 1999, at 3, 18 (quoting Jennifer Krese, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfr. Employment
Policy Director).
43. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Admin., 174 F.3d 206, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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administrative law requirements was not the prime reason-if a reason
at all-that the NPR promoted outsourcing. Its main concerns were
reducing the number of full time equivalent federal employees and
saving money. 44 It also noted that reinvention reforms did not require
the nation to "jettison the traditional values that underlie democratic
governance-values such as equal opportunity, justice, diversity, and
democracy."45 That said, the NPR did not overtly place any value on
public participation and transparency. It tended to triangulate the public
into citizens, customers, and stakeholders. It paid less attention to
citizens qua citizens because "When we are not trusted, when nothing
we say or do seems to make a difference, we feel powerless. Elections
alone do not restore that power. The power that matters in a selfgoverning democracy is the power we can exercise 'over-the-counter,'
on a daily basis, whenever we interact with our government, whenever
we seek to make our needs known. "46
The NPR' s primary focus on results, customer standards and
satisfaction,47 and stakeholder involvement in decision-making48 tended
to eclipse the values of administrative law. For example, a study of
agency performance plans at the close of the Clinton administration
revealed that seventeen of twenty-four major federal agencies
completely ignored performance targets for handling FOIA requests.
Four other agencies included such targets-proving they are relevantand an additional three referenced FOIA in some way. 49 Being a nonmission based concern for all the agencies except the National Archives
and Records Administration (which did set a performance target), FOIA
was not particularly salient to the NPR.
Reinvention simply did not speak to FOIA and other democratizing
provisions of administrative law. NPR proponents devoted little
concerted thought and effort to determining how their prescriptions for
management reforms might affect the administration of FO IA in
practice. An empirical study found that FOIA implementation was in
fact in "the path of reform," 50 though the NPR rarely mentioned it. In

44.
45.
46.
47.

AL GORE, supra note 36, at i-iv.

Id. at 8.

AL GORE, supra note 38, at 93.
BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, PUTTING CUSTOMERS FIRST '95: STANDARDS FOR
SERVING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ( 1995).
48. See GORE, supra note 38, at 33-34.
49. Suzanne J. Piotrowski & David H. Rosenbloom, Nonmission-Based Values in
Results-Oriented Public Management: The Case of Freedom of Information, 62 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 643, 651-53 (2002).
50. S. PIOTROWSKI, IN THE PATH OF REFORM: THE UNFORESEEN OUTCOMES OF PUBLIC
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unplanned fashion, some NPR initiatives strengthened FOIA
implementation, and thus governmental transparency, while others
weakened it. The net effect of omitting FOIA from agency performance
plans, as might be imagined, was to decrease organizational emphasis
on FOIA functions.
Conversely, the NPR initiatives of customer service and employee
empowerment led, in some cases, to greater access to documents, thus
strengthening governmental transparency. Customer service initiatives
pre-dated the NPR, but the renewed emphasis did lead to some concrete
changes in the way FOIA was implemented. FOIA offices became
much more accessible. Many offices for the first time started to put
phone numbers on their response letters to FOIA requesters so that
individuals had someone to call when they had questions.
The outsourcing of governmental functions and FOIA intersected
in multiple ways. The use of contractors obfuscates transparency as it
relates to the functions outsourced. However, in keeping with NPR
initiatives, federal contractors are being used creatively within the
document release process associated with FOIA implementation.
Companies are hired by federal agencies to help process FO IA requests
and identify documents. While this practice is controversial, it has
shown some promise in reducing the number of unfilled FO IA requests
the agencies have backlogged. 51 In other words, reinvention is relevant
to FOIA even though reinventers give little thought to it. The same is
true of the relationship of reinvention to administrative law more
generally, apparently without regard to who is in the White House.
President Bush's program for reforming federal administration, the
President's Management Agenda, 52 adheres to the main tenets of
reinvention. 53 Before taking office, Bush emphasized that his "policies
and . . . vision of government reform are guided by three principles:
government should be citizen-centered, results-oriented, and wherever
possible, market based."54 The President's Management Agenda, issued
MANAGEMENT REFORM ON GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY (State University of New York
Press) (forthcoming).
51. The decision to withhold or release documents requested pursuant to FOIA is
inherently governmental and cannot legally be outsourced.
52. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, THE PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA:
FISCAL YEAR2002 (2001).
53. The main difference is that the Bush administration emphasizes centralized
direction of federal agencies by the President, his closest aides, and OMB. Concomitantly,
the Bush administration does not embrace employee empowerment. See Alexis
Simendinger, Results-Oriented President Uses Levers of Power, Jan. 25, 2002,
http://www.goexec.com/dailyfed/0102/012502nj2.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
54. George W. Bush, Building a Responsive, Innovative Government, FEDERAL TIMES,
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in August 2001, places strong emphasis on "competitive sourcing,"55
which OMB treats as a focal point for implementation. 56 In 2003, OMB
concluded that of the 1,609,000 federal positions being tracked under
the President's Management Agenda, 858,000 are potentially subject to
outsourcing. 57 Like outsourcing under the NPR, competitive sourcing
places limited, if any, importance on administrative law values.
Ill. COMPETITIVE SOURCING: DECIDING WHAT AND WHEN TO
OUTSOURCE

Outsourcing within the framework of competitive sourcing
requires three-stage decision-making. First, it must be determined
whether the function involved is "inherently governmental." Inherently
governmental functions cannot be legally outsourced. OMB's Circular
A-76, the "rulebook" for competitive sourcing, defines inherently
governmental as any
activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by government personnel. These activities require the
exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority
and/or in making decisions for the government. Inherently
governmental activities normally fall into two categories: the exercise
of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures
and processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or
entitlements. 58

Examples include policymaking, contracting, "[d]etermining,
protecting, and advancing" national interests through military or
diplomatic action, judicial proceedings, contract management, matters
"significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private persons,"
and acquiring, controlling, and disposing of U.S. property. 59 Discretion
is considered

June 26, 2000, at 15 (reprinting excerpts of a June 9, 2000 address given by then Gov.
George W. Bush in Philadelphia).
55. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 52, at 17-18 (emphasis added).
56. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY SCORECARDS (2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budintegration/scorecards/agency_scorecards.html
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2005).
57. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: CONDUCTING PRIVATEPUBLIC COMPETITION IN AREASONED AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER 3 (2003).
58. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB CIRCULAR No. A-76, Attachment A, §
B(l)(a) (2003).
59. Id.
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inherently governmental if it commits the government to a course of
action when two or more alternative courses of action exist and the
decision-making is not already limited or guided by existing policies,
procedures, directions, orders, and other guidance that ( 1) identify
specified ranges of acceptable decisions or conduct and (2) subject the
discretionary authority to final approval or regular oversight by
agency officials. 60

Following these guidelines, there is nothing inherently governmental
about launching space shuttles, building databases for military
recruiters, and, probably, interrogating prisoners held in Abu Ghraib
and in similar circumstances elsewhere.
Second, the decision to competitively source requires a
determination of whether a "commercial" function (i.e., one that is not
inherently governmentally) should be retained by the government.
Retention can be based on the impracticality of subjecting specific
commercial functions to competitive sourcing exercises or the
likelihood that outsourcing would not yield the best value in return for
government spending. 61
Third, positions suitable for outsourcing are subjected to one of
two types of competitive sourcing competitions. A standard competition
is used when more than sixty-five positions are involved; a streamlined
competition when there are sixty-five or fewer. Circular A-76 contains
63 pages of detailed instructions on how to conduct these competitions
and to reach decisions regarding the retention or outsourcing of
functions. The chief decision criterion by far is cost-effectiveness. The
competitive sourcing decision places no value whatsoever on
transparency, stakeholder representation, public participation, and
protection of employees' and others' constitutional rights that are
legally guaranteed when functions are retained by the government-and
very much likely to be lost when those functions are outsourced. In this
sense, Circular A- 76 ignores the development of administrative law,
including relevant constitutional law, over the past six decades.

60. Id. at B.l.b.
61. Tichakom Hill, More Fighting Ahead Over Competitive Sourcing Goals, FEDERAL
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, available at http://federaltimes.com/index.php?S=577704 (last visited
Dec. 30, 2005). The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act requires agencies annually to
list all their non-inherently governmental positions. Such positions are considered
'commercial.' Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382 (Oct. 19, 1998).
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IV. AN AP A FOR OUTSOURCED GOVERNMENT WORK?
At first blush, an AP A for outsourced government work may sound
like an encumbering, self-defeating, unnecessary, and terribly bad idea.
Such a statute would no doubt make private entities all the more
disinclined to deal with government. 62 Certainly, the vast majority of
for-profits and many not-for-profits would be reluctant to subject their
records to FOIA requests, hold open meetings, meet with advisory
committees, and extend First Amendment-like whistleblower rights to
their employees. 63 Anything that drives up the cost of outsourcing also
detracts from its attractiveness as a strategy for accomplishing
government objectives. Conversely, applying constitutional constraints
to some outsourced functions, such as incarceration, may be a de facto
prerequisite for privatization. Theory aside, the reality is that
administrative law controls on outsourced functions are already
evolving in several forums. Arguably, it might be better to appoint a
committee of experts to analyze the issues comprehensively, much like
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure did in
the early 1940s with respect to the APA. 64
To date, the following are among the major applications of
administrative law-like controls to outsourced functions.
• State action doctrine. Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court
has unequivocally placed privatized health care in prisons under the
ambit of constitutional law. 65 The Court also made it clear that "[i]t
surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to evade the
most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply
resorting to the corporate form. " 66 According to the dissenters in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association (2001 ), the Court took a major step toward applying
constitutional constraints to private entities by creating a new category
of state action, "entwinement."67 Depending on how it is defined,
entwinement has the potential to cover a very wide variety of
outsourced activities. 68
62. Susan A. MacManus, Why Businesses are Reluctant to Sell to Governments, 51

PUB. ADMIN. REV. 328-44 (1991).
63. Pickering v. Board ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
64. U.S. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADM. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT (U.S. Gov'T
PRINTING OFFICE, 1941 ).
65. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
66. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995).
67. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 305
(2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. Federal agencies have called on contractors to analyze proposed legislation; draft
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• State Courts and Transparency. As of 2000, twenty-two states
applied freedom of information or related transparency statutes to
outsourced functions based on one or more of the following factors:
performance "of a governmental function . . . level of government
funding, ... extent of governmental involvement or regulation, and ...
whether the entity was created by the government."69
• The Federal Acquisition Regu.lation (FAR). FAR is a
"codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for
acquisitions by all [federal] executive agencies." 70 It places the
following two administrative law-like requirements on contractors
performing outsourced governmental functions:
1. Whistle blower protection. "Government contractors shall not
discharge, demote or otherwise discriminate against an employee as a
reprisal for disclosing information to a Member of Congress, or an
authorized official of an agency or of the Department of Justice,
relating to a substantial violation of law related to a contract
(including the competition for or negotiation of a contract)."71
2. Privacy Act notifications. "[I]f a contract specifically provides for
the design, development, or operation of a system of records on
individuals on behalf of an agency to accomplish an agency function,
the agency must apply the requirements of the [Privacy] Act to the
contractor and its employees working on the contract."72 This

budget requirements, reports to Congress and preambles to rules; conduct public hearings;
monitor arms control negotiations; participate on decisions regarding the export of nuclear
technology; and provide services to an inspector general. Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra
note 10.
69. Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public's Right to Know: The Debate over
Privatization and Access to Government Information under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 825, 836-53 (2000).
70. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 1.101 (2004), available at
http://www.acqnet.gov/far/01-26/html/FARtoHTML.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
71. Id. § 3.903.
72. Id.§ 24.102(c). See also id. §§ 52.224-1, 52.224-2.
As prescribed in [Federal Acquisition Regulation] 24.104, insert the following clause in
solicitations and contracts, when the design, development, or operation of a system of
records on individuals is required to accomplish an agency function:
Privacy Act Notification (Apr 1984)
The Contractor will be required to design, develop, or operate a system of records on
individuals, to accomplish an agency function subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, Public
Law 93-579, December 31, 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) and applicable agency regulations.
Violation of the Act may involve the imposition of criminal penalties.
(End of clause), and 52.224-2
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provision clearly protects individuals against the disclosure of their
personal information by contractors, other than for "routine use,"
defined as "for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for
which it was collected."73 As a practical matter however, it may not
prevent agencies from contracting private entities to collect
information that the agencies could not legally collect on their own.
Privacy Act:
As prescribed in [Federal Acquisition Regulation] 24.104, insert the following clause in
solicitations and contracts, when the design, development or operation of a system of
records on individuals is required to accomplish agency function:
Privacy Act (Apr 1984)
(a) The Contractor agrees to(1) Comply with the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act) and the agency rules and
regulations issued under the Act in the design, development, or operation of any
system of records on individuals to accomplish an agency function when the contrast
specifically identifies (i) The systems ofrecords; and
(ii) The design, development, or operation work that the contractor is to perform;
(2) Include the Privacy Act notification contained in this contract in every
solicitation and resulting subcontract and in every subcontract awarded without a
solicitation, when the work statement in the proposed subcontract requires the
redesign, development, or operation of a system of records on individuals that is
subject to the Act; and
(3) Include this clause, including this paragraph (3), in all subcontracts awarded
under this contract which requires the design, development, or operation of such a
system of records.
(b) In the event of violations of the Act, a civil action may be brought against the agency
involved when the violation concerns the design, development, or operation of a system of
records on individuals to accomplish an agency function, and criminal penalties may be
imposed upon the officers or employees of the agency when the violation concerns the
operation of a system of records on individuals to accomplish an agency function. For
purposes of the Act, when the contract is for the operation of a system of records on
individuals to accomplish an agency function, the Contractor is considered to be an
employee of the agency.
(c)(l) "Operation of a system ofrecords," as used in this clause, means performance of any
of the activities associated with maintaining the system of records, including the collection,
use, and dissemination of records.
(2) "Record," as used in this clause, means any item, collection, or grouping of
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not
limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or
employment history and that contains the person's name, or the identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a
fingerprint or voiceprint or a photograph.
(3) "System of records on individuals," as used in this clause, means a group of any
records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the
name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual.
(End of clause),
available at http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/html/52_223 ~226.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
73. Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(l-12); (a)(7).
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• Transparency. FOIA does not apply to the records of private
entities. However, if the ownership of records is transferred to a
government agency, such records are likely to be "agency records"
subject to disclosure through FOIA. The Department of Energy
Acquisition Regulation provides:
Except [records on personnel, confidential financial matters,
operations not related to (the Department of Energy), legal matters,
and some aspects of technology, intellectual property, and
procurement], . . . all records acquired or generated by the contractor
in its performance of this contract shall be the property of the
Government and shall be delivered to the Government or otherwise
disposed of by the contractor either as the contracting officer may
from time to time direct during the progress of the work or, in any
event, as the contracting officer shall direct upon completion or
termination of the contract. 74

These are important steps to apply administrative law norms and
constraints to the performance of outsourced government work. But
they are limited in scope. Contemporary public administrative
doctrine's emphasis on competitive sourcing and outsourcing clearly
threatens the administrative law regime that, beginning in 1946, has
done a great deal to make public bureaucracies in the United States
more compatible with the nation's democratic-constitutional political
institutions.
CONCLUSION: AN "APA" FOR OUTSOURCED GOVERNMENT WORK?

In 1987, an early advocate of outsourcing government functions,
E.S. Savas, called privatization "the key to better government." 75 A few
years later, outsourcing became a core tenet of the reinventing
government movement's promise to make governments "work better
and cost less." In 2001, the President's Management Agenda promoted
competitive sourcing to raise the level of sophistication in deciding
whether to outsource. Reformers from Savas to former Vice President
Al Gore to President George W. Bush have put much emphasis on

74. Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation: Access to and Ownership of
Records,
48
C.F.R.
§9.970.5204-3
(2004)
available
at
http:!/professionals. pr .doe.gov/ma5/MA5\Veb .nsf/b9a5371a6387d5bf85256a5d0058e259/f6ec030ffe98d7a905256b450045904c?Op
enDocument (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
75. E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT (1987).
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"improving the way government does business. " 76
But do outsourcing and competitive sourcing improve the way
government does government? This question can only be answered by
entering the value of administrative law requirements into the equation
when government considers outsourcing or competitive sourcing its
functions. The federal and state courts as well as federal acquisition
professionals are incrementally putting individual rights and
transparency into such equations. However, the scope of outsourcing is
now so vast that a more comprehensive and systematic approach may be
warranted. Perhaps the time has come to join experts in administrative
law with administrative reformers in an effort to determine whether the
equivalent of an APA for outsourced government functions is
warranted, and if so, to draft a model statute for federal, state, and local
government.

76. GORE, supra note 38, at iv.
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